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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Tnx Fwm AL BAxIRupTcy AcT Am ITs EsgcT oNr STATZ INsoXvSNcY
LAws.-Since Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. i22, it has been clear that
State Insolvency Laws were valid (within certain well-defined limits) during
the non-existence of a Federal Bankruptcy Act, and that upon the enactment
of a Federal Bankruptcy Act the State laws were superseded and suspended
so far as they were in conflict with the Federal legislation. The difficulty
has been in determining when there was such conflict, and it has arisen in
various ways. For instance, the Federal Bankruptcy Act permits any nat-
ural person to become a voluntary bankrupt, but provides that no involuntary
proceedings shall be taken against a farmer or a wage earner, or a person
owing less than $iooo. The question has frequently been raised whether
State Insolvency Laws are still effective in the cases of persons thus exempt-
ed by the Federal Act, and has been variously decided. See Littlefield v.
Gay, 96 Me. 422; Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. 3 (commented on in ii MIcH. L.
Riv. 60); Rockville Bank v. Latham, 88 Conn. 70; and Pitcher v. Standish,
go Conn. 6oi,(commented on in z5 Micn. L. Rzv. 68). The Supreme Court
of the United States, in the recent case of Stellwagen v. Clum, 38 Sup. Ct.
215, has now passed on another phase of the same question.
An Ohio statute (M 6343-4, Rev. Stat. Ohio; § xio2-5, General Code
of Ohio) provides that if an insolvent debtor makes a conveyance or
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suffers a judgment with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or with
intent to prefer one or more creditors, such conveyance or judgment shall
be void at the suit of any creditor; and in such creditor's suit "a receiver
may be appointed who shall take charge of all the assets of such debtor * * *
including the property so sold, transferred, mortgaged, or assigned, which
receiver shall administer all the assets of the debtor * * * for the equal
benefit of all the creditors of the debtor *** in proportion to the amount
of their respective demands * * *." An insolvent corporation in Ohio made
conveyances of lumber, which fell within the terms of the above statute;
more than four months later it made a general assignment for the benefit
of its creditors and a few days later was adjudicated bankrupt. Its trustee
in bankruptcy was in possession of the lumber thus conveyed, and the vendee
in the conveyances filed a petition asking that the lumber be turned over to
him. The trustee in bankruptcy insisted that the conveyances made to the
petitioner were fraudulent and voidable. But as the conveyances were made
and completed more than four months before bankruptcy he could not rely
upon § 6ob, which gives the trustee power to avoid and recover preferences,
nor upon § 67e, which gives him power to avoid fraudulent transfers; both
of these sections require that the transaction avoided must have taken place
within four months before bankruptcy. § 7oe, however, provides that "the
trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt which any creditor of such
bankrupt might have avoided" and places no four months' limitation of time
upon the trustee. The trustee of the bankrupt corporation therefore relied
on § 7oe in seeking to avoid the conveyances to the petitioner, and based his
right upon the right which "any creditor" would have under the Ohio statute.
He was met with the contention that the Ohio statute, because it provides
for the appointment of a receiver to administer the debtor's assets for the ben-
efit of all his creditors, is suspended by the existence of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act. The District Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Ohio
statute was not suspended and that the trustee in bankruptcy was therefore
empowered to avoid the conveyances. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit (in 218 Fed. 730, 134 C. C. A. 4o8) was unable to reach a
satisfactory conclusion, and certified the question to the Supreme Court,
which held that the Ohio statute -was not suspended by the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act.
The Supreme Court cited, in support of its decision that the Ohio statute
was not a bankruptcy law, Mayer v. Heilman, 91 U. S. 496 and In re Farrell,
176 Fed. 5o5, ioo C. C. A. 63. Both of these cases passed on an Ohio statute
governing assignments for the benefit of creditors and containing provisions,
both for a receiver and for distribution of the debtor's assets, substantially
like those in the statute considered in the principal case; and both cases
held that the assignments made under the statute were good. The principal
case of course goes much further; it holds not merely that a statutory assign-
ment passes title-which might have passed without the aid of the statute-
but that the making of a fraudulent or preferential transfer shall have the
possible effect of turning all of the debtor's property into the hands of a
receiver who shall use it for the benefit of all the creditors.
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The legality, pending the existence of a Federal Bankruptcy Act, of sim-
ilar provisions in State Insolvency laws has been questioned in numerous
cases, and it seems clear that in most cases the decisions have been against
their validity. In Ketcham v. McNamara, 72 Conn. 709; Capital Lumber Co.
v. Salsnders, 26 Idaho 4o8; Closser v. Straw;, 227 Fed. i39; and Hasbrouck
v. La Febre, 23 Wyo. 367, State statutes provided for insolvency proceedings
and gave power to an assignee or receiver to set aside preferential and
fraudulent transfers made by the insolvent; in all of these cases suits were
brought to set aside such transfers, and in each case it was held that the
suit must fail because the State statute, being in conflict with the Bank-
ruptcy Act, was suspended. And in Pelton v. Sheridan, 74 Ore. 176, it was
held, under a similar statute, that the insolvent's subsequently appointed
trustee in bankruptcy could not invoke the provision of the State statute to
set aside an attachment. It is difficult to reconcile these decisions, especially
Pelon v. Sheridan, with the principal ckse, except on one ground, namely,
that in all of these cases the State statutes provided for a discharge of the
insolvent's debts, while in the Ohio statute there is no such provision. This
point is referred to in the opinion of Air. Justice DAY, who says: "And while
it is not necessary to decide that there may not be state insolvent laws which
are suspended although not providing for a discharge of indebtedness, all the
cases lay stress upon the fact that one of the principal requisites of a true
bankruptcy law is for the benefit of the debtor in that it discharges his future
acquired property from the obligation of existing debts."
An interesting instance of the same distinction is furnished by the two
Maine cases of Moody v. Development Co., 1o2 Me. 365, and Carter, Carter
& Meigs Co. v. Stewart Drug Co., 115 Me. 289. A Maine statute, passed in
I9o5, provided for the winding up of insolvent corporations by the appoint-
ment of a receiver, and also provided, inter alia, that all claims not duly pre-
sented should be barred. Proceedings under this statute were dismissed in
the Moody case on the ground that the statute was an insolvent law and
was therefore overridden by the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Subsequently
the State statute was amended by -repealing the provision for the barring
of claims, nd when the validity of the amended law was presented in
the Carter case the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld it, saying:
"It was evidently the judgment of the Legislature that the amendment met
and overcame the objections set forth in Moody v. Development Co. * * *
[and] freed the Act of 9o5 from its unconstitutional features, and such ap-
pears to have been the opinion of this court."
There is, therefore, authority for making the broad distinction which has
been suggested, namely, that a State statute is suspended and superseded if
it attempts to bar or discharge debts, and it is continued in force if it does
not. But it is clear that this distinction, broad and simple though it be, has
not been unanimously approved. See In re Weedman Stave Co., igg Fed.
948, holding that a State statute will be suspended even though it does not
provide for a discharge, and see also the cautious language of Mr. Justice
DAY, quoted above from the opinion in the principal case.
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And on the other hand, it is argued with some plausibility that such a
State statute, even though it provides for a discharge of the debtor, may yet
be given effect as to its other provisions. The provisions for discharge are
of course suspended by the Federal Bankruptcy Act, but this does not neces-
sarily suspend the statute in toto, (Boese v. King, io8 U. S. 379) and other
provisions of the statute may well be enforced, especially under circumstances
like those in the principal case and in Pelton v. Sheridan, supra, where be-
cause of the four months' limitation, the trustee would be remediless under
the Bankruptcy Act, and where the enforcement of the apposite provisions
of the State statute would result in a benefit to many creditors instead of
one transferee. As is pointed out in the principal case, the suspension of
the Ohio statute would result in turning over to the fraudulent vendee "a part
of the estate which is being administered in bankruptcy, although the con-
veyance under which the property is claimed is voidable under the laws of
the State where it was made and the alleged right in the property secured.
We think that Congress in the Bankruptcy Act did not intend any such re-
sult, but meant to permit the trustee in bankruptcy to have the benefit of
state laws of this character which do not conflict with the aims and purposes
of- the Federal law." So, too, in Pelton v. Sheridan, supra, in a dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice BtNNMT, it is said: "The tendency of the federal
decisions on this point, of which Randolph v. Scruggs, i9o U. S. 533, 537,
is an example, seems to be to treat the assignment as valid and to recognize
it so far as it is an aid of the purpose of the law and beneficial to the bank-
rupt's estate. In its effect of dissolving the previous attachment in the state
court, the assignment was advantageous to the bankrupt's estate and efficient
in carrying out the general design of the law to provide an equal distribution
of his estate for the benefit of all his creditors in proportion to the amounts
of their respective claims. * * * Upholding the attachment, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, is at variance with this policy and secures to one
creditor a preference by reason of his attachment, which was dissolved by
the assignment under the state law, while the opposite determination of the
issue will give effect to the intent of both state and federal legislation." The
cogency of this argument is obvious, and it applies to provisions in state
statutes which contain other provisions barring claims of creditors (as in
the Connecticut, Idaho, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wyoming statutes con-
sidered in the cases cited supra) just as effectively as to provisions in state
statutes which do not contain such other provisions (as the Ohio statute in
the principal case). As is indicated above, the cases in the state courts are
clearly against this view, but the Supreme Court of the United States is not
yet committed on the question, and there is basis in its opinions for an argu-
ment in favor of the more liberal view-a view which, it is submitt.d, would
serve better to accomplish the desirable result of administering all of a bank-
rupt's estate for the'benefit of all his creditors. R. H.
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